Judgement 46 (Jim Shea) Fri, 01 Oct 1993 13:27:49 -0500

       "Proposal 445 does not `directly alter the actions which are
       required of and/or forbidden to the Speaker', but merely
       determines who the Speaker *is* under certain conditions;
       therefore, Proposal 445 passed despite the current Speaker's
       refusal to consent thereto."

Judge: Michael (accepted 1/10/93)

Judgement: TRUE (received  Sun, 3 Oct 1993 12:49:37 +1300)

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Justification:

Rule 396 says that a "proposal which would directly alter the actions
which are required of and/or forbidden to the Mighty Speaker" only
passes against the Speaker's will if a two thirds majority is
achieved.

Arguments against this decision have been put forward by Dave Bowen in
two places, in CFJ 28 and proposal 499. I will briefly deal with those
here. 

Firstly the claim is that: 

> "Proposal 445 does indeed alter the actions which are
> forbidden to the Speaker in that remaining in office for a period of
> longer than four consecutive weeks, an action that was previously
> permitted, would now be forbidden." [ from CFJ 28 ]

To say that "remaining in office" is an action seems to me to be
specious at best. Compare it with the other actions that are required
of the speaker: tabulating votes, making random determinations when
necessary etc. All of these are discrete and well-defined. Compare it
with an action forbidden to the speaker, electioneering at Proposal
time; again this is a well-defined action. "Remaining in office" is
not. 

Secondly the folowing claim is made:

> ... proposal 445, by mandating a transfer of the Speakership under
> new circumstances, requires the Speaker to carry out actions at a
> time e would not previously have had to do so.  Thus proposal 445
> does "alter the actions require of the Speaker" and therefore does
> require the consent of the current Speaker. 

I claim that the actions referred to here (presumably those actions
required by rule 402) are only _indirect_ consequences of the proposed
rule change, thus escaping the jurisdiction of 396 which requires that
a proposal of this type '_directly_ alter the actions which are
required ....' Moreover, one might also consider it possible to argue 
that altering the time at which an action is necessary does not 
constitute altering that action per se.  If both the action and the 
frequency of the action are unchanged, then is it possible to claim 
that the action is altered?