From - Sat Feb 19 15:25:31 2000 Return-Path: Received: from gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au ([131.170.42.16]) by hazard.mail.mindspring.net (Mindspring Mail Service) with ESMTP id satrqu.7kt.37kb01i for ; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 14:30:37 -0500 (EST) Received: (from majordomo@localhost) by gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au (8.8.5/8.8.5) id TAA12406 for agora-official-list; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 19:15:15 GMT Received: from fw.serc.rmit.edu.au (fw-in.serc.rmit.edu.au [131.170.42.1]) by gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au (8.8.5/8.8.5) with ESMTP id TAA12403 for ; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 19:15:10 GMT Received: (from mail@localhost) by fw.serc.rmit.edu.au (8.9.3/8.9.1) id GAA69482 for ; Sun, 20 Feb 2000 06:32:38 +1100 (EST) Received: from msuacad.morehead-st.edu(147.133.1.1) by fw.serc.rmit.edu.au via smap (V2.1) id xma069480; Sun, 20 Feb 00 06:32:34 +1100 Received: (from mpslon01@localhost) by msuacad.morehead-st.edu (8.7.1/8.7.1) id OAA16751 for agora-official@gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au; Sat, 19 Feb 2000 14:19:09 -0500 (EST) From: Michael Slone Message-Id: <200002191919.OAA16751@msuacad.morehead-st.edu> Subject: OFF: CFJ 1195 Dismissed To: agora-official@gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au (agora-official) Date: Sat, 19 Feb 2000 14:19:08 EST X-Mailer: Elm [revision: 212.4] Sender: owner-agora-official@gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au Precedence: bulk Reply-To: agora-discussion@gecko.serc.rmit.edu.au X-Mozilla-Status: 8001 X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000 X-UIDL: satrqu.7kt.37kb01i ====================================================================== CFJ 1195 Doing what is explicitly prohibited (and possibly penalized) by the Rules is a breach of the Rules, however if something is not prohibited but just penalized by the Rules then doing it is not a breach of the Rules but merely part of the Agora. ====================================================================== Called by: Peekee Judge: Wes Judgement: Judge selection: Eligible: Anthony, Sherlock, Steve, Wes Not eligible: Caller: Peekee Barred: - Had their turn: Blob, Chuck, Crito, elJefe, Elysion, Harlequin, harvel, Lee, Murphy, Wes Already served: - Defaulted: - By request: Michael On Hold: Oerjan, Palnatoke ====================================================================== History: Called by Peekee: 13 Feb 2000 12:39:48 +0000 Assigned to Wes: 13 Feb 2000 11:32:59 -0500 Dismissed by Wes: 17 Feb 2000 21:36:40 -0800 Dismissal published: As of this message ===================================================================== Caller's Arguments: ====================================================================== Evidence attached by the Caller: ====================================================================== Judge's Arguments: At first glance, this Statement seems fairly straightforward, especially in light of the various arguments and reasonings that have been put forth in the various Agoran forums since the fateful day that the question was first asked: "If the Rules don't actually forbid it, is it illegal?" Of course, that question is beyond the scope of this ruling. In fact, after examining this Statement very carefully, we found that it's relation to the overall question is peripheral, if not completely irrelevant. This particular Statement makes several claims. First, it claims that "doing what is explicitly prohibited (and possibly penalized) by the Rules is a breach of the Rules." Second, it claims that "if something is not prohibited but just penalized by the Rules then doing it is not a breach of the Rules." And thirdly, it claims that in such a case, that type of action would be "merely part of Agora." We will examine each claim one by one, and then review them to make an overall Judgement. The first claim, as it happens, is fairly straightforward. "Doing what is explicitly prohibited (and possibly penalized) by the Rules is a breach of the Rules." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Third Edition defines "breach" as "a violation or infraction, as of a law..." and go on to say that it "denotes an act or instance of breaking a law or regulation." Quite clearly if the Rules set a regularion, and a Player violates that regulation, then e has breached the Rules. The second claim, that "if something is not prohibited but just penalized by the Rules then doing it is not a breach of the Rules" leaves consideraby more room for interpretation. Key to understanding this statement is deciding the difference between "prohibited" and "penalized," if any. Both the Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary and the Heritage Dictionary of the English Language agree, word for word, that to "prohibit" is "to forbid by authority." Both also go on to describe an alternate definition of "to prevent or preclude." If the second definition is used, then to perform an action that one is prevented from performing would be impossible, thus we shall rely upon the first definition for purposes of this Judgement. Even armed, however, with this definition of "prohibit," we are hard pressed to determine what is actually prohibited by the Rules. Now, if the Statement we were working with were to say "explicitly prohibit," well, that would make this task much, much easier. But since the Statement itself allows for those actions which are implicitly prohibited, we must therefore allow for that possibility when rendering Judgement. The dictionary certainly makes no claim that we can find requiring any prohibition to be formal or explicit. In fact, it specifically mentions as example the common law that prohibits stealing, which Kelly has adequately pointed out oftentimes does not explicitly forbid the activity. Thus implicit prohibitions are included in this claim. The word "penalty" seems best described by the Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as "1. A punishment established by law or authority for a crime or an offense. 2. Something, especially a sum of money, required as a forfeit for an offense. 3. The disadvantage or painful consequences resulting from an action or a condition: neglected his health and paid the penalty." A very broad definition to say the least. In a legal sense, the first two are very closely related, differing only in the subtle target of the reference while tying into the same act or situation. The third definition would seem to apply more to a practical or moral situation, thus we will examine and discard its application to this particular Statement. As we can see, the definition of "penalty" explicitly refers to either a crime or an offense. Since it would seem that any action could only be defined as a crime or an offense if it were at least implcitly prohibited, we would contend that an action which is penalized yet not prohibited is a contradition in terms, and thus impossible. This results in the last clause, which further qualifies the impossible act, being irrelevant. We do feel compelled to mention three points of note, however, to at least partially address the issues which we believe Peekee attempted to address in this CFJ. They may perhaps result in the issue being decided informally, or at least in the formuation of a more precise Statement to be Judged. First, not all actions which are prohibited by the Rules are explicitly prohibited. In all our linguistic research, we found numerous examples of prohibitions being implicit. The very application of a penalty implicitly prohibit the action. Determining whether a particular action is prohibited or not, of course, is left to another Court. Second, not all disadvantages imposed by the Rules are penalties. There are numerous occasions where partaking of an activity results in a disadvantage to one's self, but which are obviously not a penalty. The cost of Voting, spending P-Notes to raise Priority, etc. There are some Rule-imposed disadvantages which may be arguably either a penalty or a fee, but these particular instances are for another Judge to decide on a case by case basis. And thirdly, that regardless of whether a particular action is a breach of the Rules or not, and regardless of how explicitly such an action is prohibited or permitted, one's stance on whether to perform such an action is a moral question rather than a legal question. As an individual, we would never condone that someone stack a deck in a card game, but if one does it, the game does continue. Whether the game is valid or not depends not only on the fidelity of those involved, but upon the perspective of the viewer, and even that determination is a moral judgement. There have been many arguments of the meta-game, even occasional mention of the meta-mega-game. Perhaps the moral question of fidelity would be considered the meta-meta-meta-game. But either way, it is clearly beyond the scope of a mere CFJ. In conclusion, however, it is our studied opinion that this Statement in its very nature is contradictory. We therefore DISMISS this CFJ per Rule 1563. ====================================================================== -- Clerk of the Courts harvel